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Abstract We analyze the preferences of a risk-averse auctioneer over several auction 
mechanisms with risk-neutral and symmetric bidders. We obtain the value at risk (VaR) for 
auctioneer revenue in auction mechanisms belonging to a parametric family which includes 
two classic mechanisms, the irst‑price auction and second‑price auction. By calculating the 
VaR for revenue an auctioneer can estimate the amount that will be lost within a given 
conidence level, depending on the number of bidders and the auction mechanism chosen. The 
contribution of this paper is the calculation of the VaR for auctioneer revenue in some common 
auction mechanisms that yield the same expected revenue, including irst‑price auction and 
second-price auction and the following mechanisms: Santa Claus auction, sad-loser auction 
and all-pay auction. We describe how to quantify the maximum loss for an auctioneer at a 
given probability. We study the value at risk of the auctioneer as a criterion to determine 
which auctions would best suit the auctioneer’s interests.
© 2012 Asociación Cuadernos de Economía. Published by Elsevier España, S.L. All rights reserved.
Modelos de subasta de un objeto con riesgo óptimo
Resumen Analizamos las preferencias de un subastador con aversión al riesgo en diferentes 
modelos de subasta con participantes neutrales al riesgo y simétricos. Obtenemos el valor en 
riesgo (VaR) de los ingresos del subastador en los mecanismos de subasta que pertenecen a una 
familia paramétrica que incluye dos mecanismos clásicos: la subasta de primer precio y la 
subasta de segundo precio. Mediante el cálculo del VaR de los ingresos, un subastador puede 
estimar la cantidad que se perderá dentro de un nivel de conianza dado, dependiendo del 
número de participantes y del mecanismo de subasta elegido. La novedad de este artículo es el 
cálculo del VaR de los ingresos del subastador en algunos mecanismos de subasta comunes, que 
producen los mismos ingresos esperados y que incluyen la subasta de primer precio y la subasta 
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de segundo precio, así como los siguientes mecanismos: subasta «Santa Claus», subasta 
«Perdedores Tristes» y subasta «Todos pagan». Describimos cómo cuantiicar la pérdida máxima 
de un subastador con una probabilidad dada. Estudiamos el valor en riesgo del subastador como 
un criterio para determinar qué subastas se adaptarían mejor a los intereses del subastador.
© 2012 Asociación Cuadernos de Economía. Publicado por Elsevier España, S.L. Todos los derechos 
reservados.
1. Introduction
Under some conditions, when a single object is auctioned, 
two classical auction mechanisms, the irst‑price auction 
(FPA) and second-price auction (SPA), generate the same 
expected payment by bidders and therefore the same 
expected revenue for the auctioneer (Vickrey, 1961). In 
fact, the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (Myerson, 1981) is 
veriied if two auction mechanisms have the same allocation 
rule and produce the same bidder payment with valuation 
0. If the auctioneer takes only the expected revenue into 
account (risk-neutral auctioneer) then every auction 
mechanism that satisies the Revenue Equivalence Theorem 
is equally attractive to the auctioneer. However, every 
risk-averse auctioneer would prefer the auction mechanism 
with the lowest variance (assuming, of course, that the 
bidders are risk-neutral).
To establish a preference between the classical auction 
mechanisms, their variability (usually their variance) is 
often compared. Vickrey (1961) calculated the variance for 
FPA and English auctions. Waehrer et al. (1998) proved that 
a risk-averse auctioneer prefers FPA to SPA and SPA to an 
English auction. Beltrán and Santamaría (2006) used 
simulation to analyze the variation for several auction 
mechanisms with the same expected revenue. Krishna 
(2002) proved that the price distribution in SPA is a 
mean-preserving spread of the price distribution in FPA.
The main problem with variance is that it does not 
indicate the direction of revenue deviations: revenue can 
be volatile and can suddenly take high values. An auctioneer 
is not affected if revenue is higher than expected; however, 
much lower than expected revenues could lead to 
bankruptcy. Hence, we are interested in obtaining a 
measure of the risk of losses for each auction mechanism.
In the literature we can ind a number of papers on the 
optimal choice or design of auctions, usually from the point 
of view of the expected revenue (see, for example, Myerson, 
1981; Riley and Samuelson, 1981). For this reason, if the 
auctioneer only takes into account the expected revenue, 
then every auction mechanism satisfying the Revenue 
Equivalence Theorem is identical for her. Consequently, the 
auctioneer should take into account other criteria when 
making her decision. A possible criterion is collusion 
(Robinson, 1985), another is variability (Vickrey, 1961), and 
other criteria could also be used. We aim at giving the 
auctioneer a second criterion for choosing an appropriate 
auction mode. Therefore, the original contribution of this 
paper is the analysis of risk measures applied to auctions.
Value at risk (VaR) is a measure of the worst loss at a given 
confidence level and reflects how much can be lost with 
respect to expected revenue at a certain probability (Holton, 
2004). We must bear in mind that although expected 
auctioneer revenue is a good long-term indicator, a sudden 
and unexpected decrease in actual revenue could lead to 
bankruptcy. The VaR for auctioneer revenue at a given 
conidence level quantiies the maximum loss compared to 
expected revenue. Thus, if an auctioneer knows in advance 
that the possible maximum loss is greater than what can be 
absorbed economically, the auction mechanism can 
be changed or the number of bidders can be increased to 
reduce this risk. We therefore believe that VaR can be very 
useful for auctions that, despite being equally attractive in 
terms of expected revenue, are different in terms of loss risk.
The contribution of this paper is the calculation of the 
VaR for auctioneer revenue in some common auction 
mechanisms that yield the same expected revenue, 
including FPA and SPA and the following mechanisms: Santa 
Claus auction (SCA), sad-loser auction (SLA) and all-pay 
auction (APA). Thus, we quantify the maximum loss for 
an auctioneer at a given probability.
We assume the following hypotheses:
There are n ≥ 2 risk-neutral bidders competing to buy a 
single object. The valuation of bidder i ∈ {1, …, n} is ui. Each 
type ui, which is information known only to bidder i, is an 
independent realization of a uniformly distributed 
continuous random variable Qi in [0,1]. Only bidder i 
observes the realization of ui, which relects the uncertainty 
that bidder j has about the valuation of bidder i.
Each bidder i ∈ {1, …, n} simultaneously and independently 
submits a bid bi ∈ [0,1] specifying the maximum unit-price 
offer at which he is willing to buy the object.
A strategy for bidder i ∈ {1, …, n} is a function  bi(ui): [0,1] → [0,1].
We refer to this model as the symmetric model.
Once the auctioneer has received all the bids, the highest 
bidder wins the object. The price paid by each bidder 
depends on the auction mechanism adopted for the 
transaction. Each aspect of this model and the auction 
mechanism chosen is assumed to be common knowledge. This 
situation is modeled as a single-object auction as an n‑person 
game with incomplete information (Harsanyi, 1967-1968) 
under the assumption of symmetric and risk-neutral bidders 
with independent and uniformly distributed [0,1] values.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 
we deine the parametric family of auction mechanisms for 
selling one object, and obtain the Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
for each auction mechanism in the parametric family. In 
Section 2.1. we obtain the distribution function of the 
random variable that gives the auctioneer revenue at 
the equilibrium in each auction mechanism in the parametric 
family, we prove that each auction mechanism in the 
parametric family veriies a revenue equivalence theorem 
and we calculate the variance and the VaR of the auctioneer 
revenue. In Section 2.2. we give the VaR for auctio-
neer revenue for different numbers of bidders and different 
auction mechanisms. In Section 3 we analyze other auction 
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mechanisms by comparing them with regard to their VaR for 
auctioneer revenue. Finally, Section 4 gives the conclusions.
2. First‑second‑price auction family
The two classic auction mechanisms are FPA and SPA. In FPA 
the winner pays the winning bid bi. In SPA the winner 
pays the second highest bid. Here we consider a parametric 
family of auction mechanisms that contains FPA and SPA as 
particular cases. This family, called the irst‑second‑price 
parametric family (FSP), is a set of auction mechanisms Aϒ 
whose proit function for bidder i is:
Bi
ϒ (ui, b1, … , bn) = 
⎧
⎨
⎩
ui − ϒbi − (1 − ϒ) maxj≠i bj if bi > maxj≠i bj ; ϒ ∈ [0,1]
 0  if bi <  maxj≠i bj
That is, if i bids the highest amount, then i buys the 
object and possibly pays different prices: an amount y at 
price bi and the remaining amount (1 − ϒ) at the second 
highest bid, maxj≠i bj. In particular, if ϒ = 1 we have the FPA 
and if ϒ = 0, we have the SPA.
We can assume, given the symmetry of the model, that 
bi(ui) = b(ui) is the bid function used in the equilibrium by all 
bidders where b(ui) is a strictly monotone and differentiable 
function. The following proposition gives the Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium for any auction mechanism belonging to FSP.
Proposition 1. If the hypotheses for the symmetric model 
are verified and an auction mechanism Aϒ ∈ FSP is used, 
then the unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
_bϒ(u1),…,bϒ(un)+ with the condition limui→0+b
ϒ(ui) = 0, is:
bϒ(ui) = 
n − 1
n − 1 + ϒ  ui
Proof. Let ϒ = Max{Q1, … , Qi−1, Qi+1, … ,Qn} be the highest-
order statistic for the other n − 1 bidder types. Then the 
proit for bidder i is:
Bi
ϒ _ui, b(u1), … , bi, … , b(un)+ = 
⎧
⎨
⎩
ui − ϒbi − (1 − ϒ)b(ϒ) if b−1(bi) > ϒ ; ϒ ∈ [0,1]
 0 if b−1(bi) < ϒ
Bidder i knows his own type ui, but ϒ is a random variable, 
so the expected proit for bidder i is given by:
BM(ui,bi,b) = e0
1 Biϒ  _ui, b(u1), … , bi, … , b(un)+ ƒ(ϒ)dϒ = 
 = e0
b−1(bi)_ui − ϒbi − (1 − ϒ)b(ϒ)+(n − 1)ϒ n − 2dϒ = 
 = (n − 1) ⎛
⎝
(ui − ϒbi) _b
−1(bi)+n−1
n − 1  − (1 − ϒ) e0
b−1(bi) b(ϒ )ϒ n − 2dϒ⎞
⎠
Thus, bi is the best bid for bidder i if it maximizes the 
expected proit, given type ui. The derivative with respect 
to bi is:
∂
∂bi
 BM(ui, bi, b) = 
= (n − 1) ⎛
⎝
−ϒ _b−1(bi)+n−1
n − 1  + (ui − ϒ bi) _b
−1(bi)+n−2 
d
dbi
 _b−1(bi)+ −
− (1 − ϒ )bi _b−1(bi)+ n−2 ddbi _b
−1(bi)+
⎛
⎝
 =
= −ϒ _b−1(bi)+ n−1 + (n − 1) (ui − bi) _b−1(bi)+ n−2 ddbi _b
−1(bi)+
As b−1(bi) = ui ⇔ bi = b(ui), replacing and setting the above 
equation equal to zero, we obtain the following differential 
equation:
ϒ ui  
d
dui
  bϒ  (ui) + (n − 1) bϒ  (ui) = (n − 1) ui
Then the solution satisfying the condition limui→0+b
ϒ(ui) = 
= 0 is: 
bϒ(ui) =   
n − 1
n − 1 + ϒ   .
2.1. Statistical properties of the revenue
Once the Bayesian Nash equilibrium has been determined, 
we can calculate the distribution, expectation, variance 
and VaR of the auctioneer revenue. It is easy to ind that the 
expected revenue is independent of ϒ , which means that 
there is a revenue equivalence result for every auction 
mechanism belonging to FSP.
Let Xϒ  be the random variable that gives the auctioneer 
revenue at equilibrium in an auction mechanism Aϒ  ∈ FSP:
Xϒ  = ϒ bϒ(ϒ ) + (1 − ϒ ) bϒ(Z) = ϒ  n − 1
n − 1 + ϒ   ϒ + (1 − ϒ ) 
n − 1
n − 1 + ϒ  Z,
where ϒ  is the highest-order and Z is the second-highest-order 
statistic of {Q1, … ,Qn}. The variable Xϒ  is distributed in 
⎡0, n − 1
n − 1 + ϒ
 ⎤
⎣ ⎦ and its probability distribution function is given by:
Fϒ(x) = ⎛
⎝
 (n − 1 + ϒ )n
ϒ (n − 1)n   x
n⎞
⎠
 I ⎡
⎣
0, ϒ (n − 1)n
n − 1 + ϒ
⎡
⎣
(x) + 
+ 1ϒ (n−1)n 
⎛
⎝
_(n−1+ϒ )x+n − _(n−1+ϒ )x − (n−1)ϒ +
n
(1−n)n−1
⎞
⎠
 I ⎡
⎣
ϒ (n−1)n
n−1+ϒ
, n−1
n−1+ϒ
⎡
⎣
(x)+
+I ⎡
⎣
n−1
n−1+ϒ ,∞
⎡
⎣
(x)
If ϒ  ∈ (0,1) and
Fϒ = 0 (x) = nxn−1 − (n−1)xn
Fϒ = 1 (x) =  n
n
(n−1)n  x
n I ⎡
⎣
0,n − 1
n
⎡
⎣
(x) + I ⎡
⎣
n−1
n
,∞ ⎡
⎣
(x)
Then the expected auctioneer revenue is:
E(Xϒ) =  n−1
n+1
 , ∀ϒ ∈[0,1]
If the auctioneer takes into account only expected 
revenue (risk-neutral auctioneer), then every auction 
mechanism belonging to FSP is equally attractive. However, 
every risk-averse auctioneer could prefer the auction 
mechanism with lowest variance (assuming, of course, that 
the bidders are risk-neutral).
The variance of the auctioneer revenue is:
V(Xϒ) =  (n−1)2 _n(ϒ 2−2ϒ +2)+2(ϒ −1)+
(n+2)(n+1)2(n+ϒ −1)2  , ∀ϒ ∈[0,1]
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This decreases in ϒ  and therefore the auction mechanism 
belonging to FSP with minimum revenue variance is the 
FPA.
The main problem with variance is that it does not 
indicate the sign of revenue deviations: revenue can be 
volatile and suddenly take high values. Given a conidence 
level b, the VaR for auctioneer revenue is the smallest 
number k such that the probability that the difference 
between expected and actual revenue (the loss) is less than 
k and greater than b in auction mechanism Aϒ:
VaRϒβ = inf{k ∈ [0, E(Xϒ)]: P(E(Xϒ) − Xϒ < k) ≥ β }
= inf ⎧⎨
⎩
k ∈ ⎡
⎣
0,
n−1
n+1
 ⎤
⎦
 : F ϒ ⎛
⎝
 n−1
n+1
 − k⎞
⎠
 ≤ 1 − β ⎫⎬
⎭
.
Example
If there are two bidders (n = 2).
VaRϒb = inf k ∈ 0,
1
3
 : Fϒ  1
3
 − k  ≤ 1 − b  
 if ϒ  < 1 − b
 = 
3√1 − ϒ  √b − 2 + ϒ
3(1 + ϒ )
−3√1 − b √ϒ  + 1 + ϒ
3(1 + ϒ )
 if ϒ  ≥ 1 − b
Figure 1 shows VaR for two bidders at a conidence level 
of 0.95 and ϒ  ∈ [0,1].
2.2. Numerical results
In this section we give the VaR for auctioneer revenue for 
different numbers of bidders and different auction 
mechanisms of parameter ϒ . We take two typical conidence 
levels, 0.95 and 0.99. We also compute the relative VaR 
(RVaR) given by:
RVaRϒb = 
VaRϒb 
E(Xϒ)
  × 100 = n + 1
n − 1   VaR
ϒ
b × 100.
Tables 1 and 2 list values of VaR and RVaR for different 
auction mechanisms and numbers of bidders for conidence 
levels of 0.95 and 0.99 respectively.
The auction mechanisms belonging to FSP  with the lowest 
and highest VaR for revenue are FPA (ϒ = 1) and SPA (ϒ = 0) 
respectively. For example, if the number of bidders is n = 4, 
with probability ≥ 0.95, the difference between expected 
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
VaR
 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
 gamma
Figure 1 VaRϒβ for n = 2.
Table 1 VaRg0.95 and RV aR
g
0.95
g/n 2 3 4 8 10 20 30 40 100
0 0.308 0.3647 0.3514 0.2485 0.2124 0.1209 0.0841 0.0644 0.0268
92.4% 72.93% 58.57% 31.95% 25.95% 13.36% 8.99% 6.77% 2.73%
0.1 0.2691 0.3312 0.324 0.2332 0.2 0.1144 0.0797 0.0611 0.02543
80.71% 66.24% 54.01% 29.98% 24.43% 12.65% 8.52% 6.43% 2.59%
0.2 0.25 0.3041 0.3007 0.2194 0.189 0.1084 0.0757 0.0581 0.0242
75% 60.82% 50.11% 28.21% 23.04% 11.98% 8.09% 6.1% 2.47%
0.3 0.2391 0.2856 0.2818 0.2073 0.1785 0.103 0.072 0.0553 0.023
71.74% 57.11% 46.96% 26.66% 21.81% 11.39% 7.69% 5.81% 2.35%
0.4 0.2323 0.2738 0.2682 0.1971 0.1699 0.0983 0.0687 0.0528 0.022
69.7% 54.76% 44.7% 25.35% 20.76% 10.86% 7.35% 5.55% 2.25%
0.5 0.2279 0.2661 0.2592 0.1892 0.163 0.0943 0.066 0.0507 0.0212
68.38% 53.22% 43.2% 24.33% 19.92% 10.42% 7.05% 5.33% 2.16%
0.6 0.2251 0.261 0.2532 0.1836 0.158 0.0913 0.0638 0.049 0.0205
67.52% 52.2% 42.2% 23.6% 19.31% 10.09% 6.82% 5.15% 2.09%
0.7 0.2233 0.2577 0.2493 0.1799 0.1546 0.0891 0.0623 0.0478 0.02
66.99% 51.54% 41.55% 23.13% 18.9% 9.85% 6.66% 5.03% 2.04%
0.8 0.2222 0.2557 0.2469 0.1776 0.1526 0.0878 0.0613 0.0471 0.0196
66.67% 51.14% 41.16% 22.84% 18.65% 9.71% 6.56% 4.95% 2%
0.9 0.2217 0.2547 0.2457 0.1764 0.1515 0.0871 0.0608 0.0467 0.0195
66.51% 50.94% 40.95% 22.68% 18.52% 9.63% 6.5% 4.91% 1.99%
1 0.2215 0.2544 0.2454 0.1761 0.1512 0.087 0.0607 0.0466 0.0194
 66.46% 50.88% 40.89% 22.64% 18.48% 9.61% 6.49% 4.9% 1.98%
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and actual revenue is ≤ 0.3514 in SPA and ≤ 0.2454 in FPA. 
For the same probability level, FPA yields smaller losses for 
the auctioneer. The expected revenue in this case is 3/5, so 
at the 95% conidence level the loss will not exceed 58.57% 
in SPA nor exceed 40.89% in FPA.
The VaR for auctioneer revenue tends to 0 when the 
number of bidders increases in all auction mechanisms 
belonging to FSP, while revenue tends to 1.
By calculating VaR, an auctioneer can estimate at a given 
confidence level the maximum amount that can be lost, 
depending on the number of bidders and the auction 
mechanism chosen.
3. Other auction mechanisms
There are of course endless auction mechanisms. We 
analyzed a parametric family containing the two most 
common, but there are other auction mechanisms that 
while giving the same expected auctioneer revenue, can 
yield VaR that is less than that for FPA. This paper shows a 
method for measuring the risk and thus provides the 
auctioneer with a second criterion for choosing the most 
suitable auction mechanism.
Below we consider other auction mechanisms that can be 
found in different contexts: APA, SLA and SCA. The expected 
auctioneer revenue is the same as in any auction mechanism 
belonging to FSP. The VaR for auctioneer revenue for these 
other mechanisms was obtained by simulation.
3.1. All‑pay auction
In this auction mechanism the highest bidder wins the 
object but all bidders pay their bid. The proit function for 
bidder i ∈ {1, …, n} is:
 ui − bi if bi > maxj≠i bjBiAP(ui,b1, … , bn) =   −bi if bi < maxj≠i bj
It is well known that the symmetric Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium (bAP(u1), … , bAP(un)) is
bAP(ui) = 
(n − 1)ui n
n
 .
Let XAP be the random variable that gives the auctioneer 
revenue in APA:
XAP = n − 1
n
 ∑ni=1Q
n
i  .
3.2. Sad‑loser auction
In this auction mechanism, the highest bidder wins the 
object but pays nothing. All other bidders pay their bids. 
Then the proit function for bidder i ∈ {1, … , n} is:
 ui  if bi > maxj≠i bjBiSL(ui,b1, … , bn) =   −bi if bi < maxj≠i bj
It is well known that the symmetric Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium _ bSL(u1), … , bSL(un)+ is
bSL(ui) = 
(n − 1)ui n
n(1 − ui n−1  .
Hence let XSL be the random variable that gives the 
auctioneer revenue in SLA:
XSL = n − 1
n
 ∑ni=2 
ϒ n(i)
1 − ϒ(i)n−1  ,
where Y(i) is the ith-order statistic for {Q1, … ,Qn}.
Table 2 VaRg0.99 and RV aR
g
0.99
g/n 2 3 4 8 10 20 30 40 100
0 0.3283 0.4411 0.4591 0.3677 0.3225 0.1936 0.1371 0.106 0.0447
98.5% 88.22% 76.52% 47.28% 39.42% 21.39% 14.65% 11.14% 4.56%
0.1 0.3046 0.4048 0.4255 0.3459 0.3042 0.1835 0.1301 0.1007 0.0426
91.38% 80.95% 70.92% 44.47% 37.18% 20.28% 13.91% 10.58% 4.34%
0.2 0.2961 0.3855 0.4017 0.3277 0.2887 0.1747 0.124 0.096 0.0406
88.82% 77.09% 66.96% 42.14% 35.28% 19.3% 13.26% 10.09% 4.15%
0.3 0.2912 0.3746 0.3872 0.3136 0.2762 0.1673 0.1189 0.092 0.039
87.36% 74.92% 64.54% 40.32% 33.76% 18.49% 12.71% 9.67% 3.98%
0.4 0.2882 0.3677 0.3781 0.3034 0.2669 0.1615 0.1147 0.0888 0.0376
86.45% 73.54% 63.02% 39.01% 32.63% 17.85% 12.26% 9.33% 3.84%
0.5 0.2862 0.3632 0.3721 0.2965 0.2605 0.1572 0.1116 0.0863 0.0366
85.86% 72.64% 62.01% 38.12% 31.83% 17.37% 11.93% 9.08% 3.73%
0.6 0.2849 0.3602 0.3681 0.2919 0.2562 0.1542 0.1094 0.0846 0.0358
85.48% 72.04% 61.35% 37.53% 31.3% 17.04% 11.69% 8.89% 3.65%
0.7 0.2841 0.3583 0.3655 0.2889 0.2533 0.1522 0.1079 0.0835 0.0353
85.24% 71.66% 60.91% 37.14% 30.96% 16.82% 11.53% 8.77% 3.6%
0.8 0.2836 0.3571 0.3639 0.287 0.2515 0.151 0.107 0.0827 0.035
85.09% 71.43% 60.65% 36.9% 30.74% 16.69% 11.44% 8.7% 3.57%
0.9 0.2834 0.3566 0.3631 0.286 0.2506 0.1503 0.1065 0.0824 0.0348
85.02% 71.31% 60.51% 36.78% 30.63% 16.62% 11.39% 8.66% 3.55%
1 0.2833 0.3564 0.3628 0.2857 0.2503 0.1502 0.1064 0.0823 0.3048
 85% 71.27% 60.47% 36.74% 30.6% 16.6% 11.37% 8.65% 3.54%
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3.3. Santa Claus auction
Finally, in the SCA mechanism the highest bidder wins the 
object and pays his own bid bi, ∈ {1, … , n}, but all bidders 
receive the amount bi
n
n
. Then the proit function for bidder 
i is:
 
ui − bi + bi
n
n  if bi > maxj≠i bj
Bi
SC(ui,b1, … , bn) =  
 
bi
n
n  if bi < maxj≠i bj
The symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium (bSC(u1),…, 
bSC(un)) is given by
bSC(ui) = ui.
Let XSC be the random variable that gives the auctioneer 
revenue in SCA:
XSC = ϒ − 1n   Qni  ,
where ϒ is the highest-order statistic for {Q1, … , Qn}.
3.4. Numerical results
We calculated the sample VaR for the auctioneer revenue in 
the above three auction mechanisms. For this, each auction 
mechanism was repeated 100 000 times. Tables 3 and 4 show 
VaR and RVaR values for the auctioneer revenue for different 
numbers of bidders in SCA, APA and SLA mechanism at 
conidence levels of 0.95 and 0.99 respectively.
We can observe that the VaR for auctioneer revenue in 
SCA tends to 0. In SLA, the VaR for auctioneer revenue is 
very high and decreases only slightly with increasing 
competition (for n = 1000, b = 0.95 the RVaR is 98.4%). In 
APA the VaR for auctioneer revenue is also very high, but 
seems to increase with competition (for n = 1000, b = 0.95 
the RVaR is 91.25%), meaning the auctioneer can have lower 
VaR with two bidders than with another number of bidders. 
Menicucci (2009) proved that in APA, if t he type distribution 
satisfies some specific assumptions, the volatility of 
auctioneer revenue increases with competition.
4. Conclusions
We analyzed a parametric family of auction mechanisms 
FSP containing FPA and SPA as particular cases. We assumed 
hypotheses that included independent and uniformly 
distributed [0,1] types. We obtained a unique Bayesian 
Nash equilibrium for each auction mechanism belonging to 
FSP.
For a risk-neutral auctioneer, every auction mechanism 
belonging to FSP is equally attractive, but a risk-averse 
auctioneer would prefer the mechanism with the lowest 
VaR. We calculated the VaR for auctioneer revenue for the 
auction mechanisms belonging to FSP.
Calculation of VaR enables the auctioneer to estimate the 
maximum amount that can be lost at a given confidence 
level, depending on the number of bidders and the auction 
mechanism used.
The results could also be useful from another point of view: 
if an auctioneer knows in advance that the possible maximum 
loss is greater than what can be absorbed economically, a 
different auction mechanism can be chosen or the number of 
bidders can be increased to reduce this risk.
We must bear in mind that although the expected 
auctioneer revenue is a good long-term indicator, a sudden 
Table 3 VaR0.95 and RVaR0.95
n 2 3 4 8 10 20 30 40 100
SCA 0.1909 0.1931 0.1798 0.1217 0.1007 0.0571 0.0391 0.0297 0.0123
57.26% 38.62% 29.96% 15.65% 12.31% 6.31% 4.18% 3.13% 1.25%
APA 0.3008 0.4528 0.5443 0.7048 0.7426 0.822 0.8493 0.8653 0.8916
90.23% 90.55% 90.71% 90.62% 90.76% 90.85% 90.79% 90.96% 90.96%
SLA 0.333 0.498 0.5961 0.7697 0.8086 0.8926 0.9215 0.9374 0.9649
 99.9% 99.6% 99.35% 98.96% 98.83% 98.65% 98.51% 98.55% 98.44%
Table 4 VaR0.99 and RVaR0.99
n 2 3 4 8 10 20 30 40 100
SCA 0.2668 0.3112 0.2991 0.2228 0.1933 0.1129 0.0787 0.0598 0.025
80.05% 62.24% 49.84% 28.64% 23.63% 12.48% 8.42% 6.29% 2.55%
APA 0.3272 0.4909 0.5888 0.764 0.8032 0.8886 0.918 0.9245 0.9628
98.15% 98.18% 98.13% 98.23% 98.17% 98.21% 98.13% 98.24% 98.23%
SLA 0.3333 0.4998 0.5996 0.7767 0.8169 0.903 0.9333 0.9493 0.9781
 99.99% 99.97% 99.94% 99.86% 99.85% 99.81% 99.76% 99.79% 99.78%
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and unexpected decrease in actual revenue could still lead 
to bankruptcy. In addition, we considered other auction 
mechanisms (SLA, APA and SCA).
The variance and VaR followed the same order for 
the auctioneer revenue obtained in the different auction me-
chanisms considered. If n = 2, the order is SCA < FPA < APA < 
< SPA < SLA. Table 5 summarizes the VaR and the RVaR values 
for all auction mechanisms for two bidders and conidence 
levels b = 0.95 and 0.99. If n > 2, the order is SCA < FPA< 
< SPA < APA < SLA. Tables 6 and 7 summarize the VaR and 
RVaR values for all auction mechanisms for different 
numbers of bidders and confidence levels b = 0.95 and 
0.99 respectively.
We can observe that the VaR for auctioneer revenue in 
SCA tends to 0 when the competition increases, just like the 
auction mechanisms belonging to the family FSP. In 
addition, the VaR in SCA is lower than in any auction 
mechanism belonging to FSP.
SCA has the lowest VaR for auctioneer revenue among all 
the auction mechanisms analyzed and a VaR for bidder proit 
equal to 0. In SLA the VaR for auctioneer revenue is very 
high and only decreases slightly with increasing competition. 
In APA the VaR for auctioneer revenue is also very high, but 
seems to increase with competition. This means that the 
auctioneer can expect a lower VaR with two bidders than 
with any other number of bidders. Menicucci (2009) proved 
Table 5 VaRb and RVaRb for the revenue for n = 2,  
b = 0.95, 0.99
g/b 0.95 0.99
SLA 0.333 99.9% 0.3333 9.99%
0 0.308 92.4% 0.3283 98.5%
APA 0.3008 90.23% 0.3272 98.15%
0.1 0.2691 80.71% 0.3046 91.38%
0.2 0.25 75% 0.2961 88.82%
0.3 0.2391 71.74% 0.2912 87.36%
0.4 0.2323 69.7% 0.2882 86.45%
0.5 0.2279 68.38% 0.2862 85.86%
0.6 0.2251 67.52% 0.2849 85.48%
0.7 0.2233 66.99% 0.2841 85.24%
0.8 0.2222 66.67% 0.2836 85.09%
0.9 0.2217 66.51% 0.2834 85.02%
1 0.2215 66.46% 0.2833 85%
SCA 0.1909 57.26% 0.2668 80.05%
Table 6 VaR0.95 and RVaR0.95 for the revenue for n > 2
g/n 3 4 8 10 20 30 40 100
SLA 0.498 0.5961 0.7697 0.8086 0.8926 0.9215 0.9374 0.9649
99.6% 99.35% 98.96% 98.83% 98.65% 98.51% 98.55% 98.44%
APA 0.4528 0.5443 0.7048 0.7426 0.822 0.8493 0.8653 0.8916
90.55% 90.71% 90.62% 90.76% 90.85% 90.79% 90.96% 90.96%
0 0.3647 0.3514 0.2485 0.2124 0.1209 0.0841 0.0644 0.0268
72.93% 58.57% 31.95% 25.95% 13.36% 8.99% 6.77% 2.73%
0.1 0.3312 0.324 0.2332 0.2 0.1144 0.0797 0.0611 0.02543
66.24% 54.01% 29.98% 24.43% 12.65% 8.52% 6.43% 2.59%
0.2 0.3041 0.3007 0.2194 0.189 0.1084 0.0757 0.0581 0.0242
60.82% 50.11% 28.21% 23.04% 11.98% 8.09% 6.1% 2.47%
0.3 0.2856 0.2818 0.2073 0.1785 0.103 0.072 0.0553 0.023
57.11% 46.96% 26.66% 21.81% 11.39% 7.69% 5.81% 2.35%
0.4 0.2738 0.2682 0.1971 0.1699 0.0983 0.0687 0.0528 0.022
54.76% 44.7% 25.35% 20.76% 10.86% 7.35% 5.55% 2.25%
0.5 0.2661 0.2592 0.1892 0.163 0.0943 0.066 0.0507 0.0212
53.22% 43.2% 24.33% 19.92% 10.42% 7.05% 5.33% 2.16%
0.6 0.261 0.2532 0.1836 0.158 0.0913 0.0638 0.049 0.0205
52.2% 42.2% 23.6% 19.31% 10.09% 6.82% 5.15% 2.09%
0.7 0.2577 0.2493 0.1799 0.1546 0.0891 0.0623 0.0478 0.02
51.54% 41.55% 23.13% 18.9% 9.85% 6.66% 5.03% 2.04%
0.8 0.2557 0.2469 0.1776 0.1526 0.0878 0.0613 0.0471 0.0196
51.14% 41.16% 22.84% 18.65% 9.71% 6.56% 4.95% 2%
0.9 0.2547 0.2457 0.1764 0.1515 0.0871 0.0608 0.0467 0.0195
50.94% 40.95% 22.68% 18.52% 9.63% 6.5% 4.91% 1.99%
1 0.2544 0.2454 0.1761 0.1512 0.087 0.0607 0.0466 0.0194
50.88% 40.89% 22.64% 18.48% 9.61% 6.49% 4.9% 1.98%
SCA 0.1931 0.1798 0.1217 0.1007 0.0571 0.0391 0.0297 0.0123
 38.62% 29.96% 15.65% 12.31% 6.31% 4.18% 3.13% 1.25%
that if the type distribution satisies some speciic assump‑
tions in APA, the volatility of auctioneer revenue increases 
with competition.
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